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STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
By JAMES C. QUARLES*
Since a statute is to some extent involved in almost every case, and since
every statute deals with some aspect of substantive or procedural law
falling into a more or less definite classification, it is difficult to determine
which cases should be discussed in a section on the construction of statutes
and the effects of constitutional requirements regarding the form of
statutes and legislative procedure. The cases considered in this division are
those which seem to set forth some approach to statutory construction or
which consider various aspects of legislative form and procedure. Most
of these cases are dealt with to some extent in other sections of this survey,
and their facts and holdings will be set forth only to the extent necessary
for an understanding of the principle problems here discussed.
"The cardinal rule for the construction of statutes is to try to ascertain
the intent of the legislature,"' and recent Georgia cases show various
guides courts may use in striving to ascertain and then to effectuate this
intent. The use of three well-recognized devices for determining legislative
intention was illustrated by the opinion in Thomas v. State,2 which reversed a burglary conviction because of the trial court's refusal to permit
the defendant's wife to testify in support of his motion for a continuance
because of the absence of a witness subpoenaed by the wife. The question
was the construction of Code Section 38-1604 ,which, with exceptions not
here material, provides that husband and wife "shall not be competent.
or compellable to give evidence in any criminal proceeding for or against
each other." In construing this statute as not making the wife incompetent in
this situation, the court used the statute's preamble to seek its purpose,
the legislative history of the statute, and the construction Georgia courts
had previously given to a similar statute. The Code section involved was,
along with Code Section 38-416 (providing in essence that a defendant in
a criminal proceeding is not competent or compellable to give evidence for
or against himself), originally part of one statute.' The purpose of this
original statute, as shown by its preamble, was to enlarge the class of
persons who could testify. Code Section 38-416 had previously been held
to raise no bar to a defendant's testifying in regard to more or less collateral matters such as here involved. Since the two sections were meant
to be applied to the same sort of proceeding, a defendant's wife was held
*Associate Professor of Law and Acting Dean, Walter F. George School of Law,
Mercer University; B.A., 1942, LL.B., 1945, University of Virginia; Member Virginia Bar, American and Georgia Bar Associations.
1. Lamons v. Yarbrough, 206 Ga. 50, 55 S.E.2d 551 (1949). See also Thomas v. State,
81 Ga. App. 59, 58 S.E.2d 213 (1950).
2. 81 Ga. App. 59, 58 S.E.2d 213 (1950).
3. Ga. Laws 1866, p. 138.
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competent to testify in his behalf in a proceeding to continue a criminal
case.
Glustrom v. State4 reversed a misdemeanor conviction for violating a
regulation of the Commissioner of Revenue prohibiting the transportation
of distilled spirits by wholesalers and retailers in motor vehicles other than
those registered and marked in a certain way and accompanied by an invoice giving details of the shipment. The statute made criminal the violation of rules and regulations "in accord with the provisions of this Act."
In determining that violation of the above regulation was enforceable by
suspension or cancellation of the license rather than as a misdemeanor,
and that the statute made crimes out of violations of only those regulations
"in harmony with what the Assembly had' already declared to be a crime,"
the court gave effect to two well-recognized canons of statutory construction-that statutory language susceptible of constructions which will lead
to either a constitutitonal or an unconstitutional result will be construed
so as to be constitutional, 5 and that criminal statutes are to be strictly
construed.'
Although the statutory construction approach was not vital to the determination of the case, the Supreme Court of Georgia, in Publix-Lucas
Theaters v. City of Brunszdick,7 recognized the rule that strict construction
is to be given to those statutes levying taxes and restricting trade or common occupations. The court determined that an assailed tax was an occupation tax rather than a license fee or tax, and therefore invalid because
another occupation tax had been imposed for the same period.
In at least three cases decided by Georgia appellate courts during the
survey period, the court was led to adopt one construction over another
because it felt that a construction different from the one accepted would
lead to an unreasonable result or would render the statute ineffective. In
Lam ons v. Yarbrough,' one attack on a statute' relating to dental hygienists was that a section referred to "license and license certificate as set out
in Section i of this Act," whereas section i only repealed a former law on
the subject. Section 2 provided for licenses and license certificates, and
the court, feeling the reference to section i was a clerical error which, if
given effect, would render the statute meaningless, construed "I" in the
referring section as though it were "2."
In Stelling v. Richmond County, ° an action by one who the court found
was a public officer to recover salary, the act relating to tenure of office
was contended not to be applicable to casual or temporary employees, i.e.,
those employed at the will of the Board of Commissioners. The court
found that the statute would be ineffective if so construed, as only one person would come under the statute, there being only one who was not either
employed at the time of the passage of the act or otherwise excluded.
Sellers v. City of Summerville" involved an action for a declaratory
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

206 Ga. 734, 58 S.E.2d 534 (1950).
Id. at 739, 58 S.E.2d at 537.
Id. at 738, 58 S.E.2d at 536.
206 Ga. 206, 56 S.E.2d 254 (1949).
205 Ga. 827, 55 S.E.2d 213 (1950).
Ga. Laws 1949, p. 1192.
81 Ga. App. 571, 59 S.E.2d 414 (1950).
81 Ga. App. 406, 58 S.E.2d 855 (1950).

19501

STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION

judgment, ii which the judge of the Rome Judicial Circuit had ruled he
had no jurisdiction to enter any judgment because of the statute 2 which
created the Lookout Judicial Circuit. This act transferred to the latter circuit the litigation, etc., in the superior courts of the counties in
the new circuit to the new circuit.
In consti'uing the statute, the Court
of Appeals concluded that the Rome Judicial Circuit continued until
January I, 195i, and, with the exception of the section providing for the
election of a judge at the 195o general election, the statute did not go
into effect until the later date. The court pointed out that the original
bill provided for appointment of a judge by the governor to serve until
the end of 195o and until the election and qualification of his successor;
but this was amended to provide for the judge's election in i95o and to
postpone the date the new circuit should come into effect to January I,
I95i. Thus on the basis of legislative history and the unreasonableness
of another construction (leaving 4 counties without a judge for nearly a
year) the court construed the act as not setting up a new circuit until the
1951 date.

In Hunt v. Glenn' the court apparently felt that the wording of the
statute involved:was so clear that resort to anything but its language was
not required. One statute" authorized the State Board of Education to
establish a minimum salary schedule for bus drivers, with the requirement
that there be a differential between drivers of publicly owned and privately
owned buses. The 1949 General Appropriations Act 5 contained a provision
that each bus driver should receive additional compensation on the basis
of four cents a mile in addition to the compensation in effect for the school
year 1946-1947. Also, the board was directed to set minimum salaries of
bus drivers. The board, however, adopted a rule differentiating between
contracted transportation and salaried drivers by providing an additional
four cents a mile for the former and an additional two cents a mile for
the latter. The Supreme Court held that the intention of the General
Assembly was to grant four cents a mile additional compensation to all
drivers, and the rule distinguishing between the two classes of drivers was
inharmonious with the clear purpose of the statute and thus invalid.
A good example of the use of statutes on the same subject to determine
the construction of a given statute is the opinion in Colbert v. State. 6 No
useful purpose would be served by giving in detail the court's consideration
of various statutes enacted in regard to intoxicating beverages and particularly to wine. In affirming a judgment overruling demurrers to an
indictment charging illegal possession of wine, the Court of Appeals went
exhaustively into the purposes and meaning of many statutes. 7
As for constitutional requirements regarding legislative procedure and
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Ga. Laws 1950, p. 23.
206 Ga. 664, 58 S.E.2d 137 (1950).
Ga. Laws 1947, p. 1461, GA. CODE ANN. § 32-424 (Supp. 1947).
Ga. Laws 1949, p. 1508.
80 Ga. App. 641, 56 S.E.2d 830 (1949).
See also Barrentine v. Griner, 205 Ga. 830, 55 S.E.2d 536 (1949), in which the court
stated that the statute regulating the calling of an election on the question of taxing and controlling alcoholic beverages, Ga. Laws, Ex. Sess. 1937-38, p. 103, GA.
CODE ANN. § 58-1003 (1947 Supp.), and the statute relating to calling an election to
nullify a previous election, Ga. Laws 1941, p. 199, GA. CODE ANN. § 58-1010.1 (1947
Supp.).
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the form of statutes, several provisions of the Georgia Constitution were
considered during the period under discussion. These provisions were the
ones vesting legislative power in the General Assembly,"8 requiring that
each bill be read three times on separate days in each House,"2 requiring that a law shall not refer to more than one subject or contain matter different from that expressed in the title,2 ' and requiring a copy of the
notice of intention to apply for local legislation certified by the publisher
or an affidavit of the author regarding publication to be a part of local
and special bills."
Capitol Distributing Co. v. Redwine 22 involved an action to enjoin collection of excise taxes on wine and malt beverages. The statute23 was
alleged to be invalid on the ground, inter alia, that there had been violations of the constitutional provisions respecting passage by the legislature,
the reading of bills, and unity of subject and expression of the subject in
the title. It was alleged that a part of the title was added after the legislature had dealt with the bill, and therefore that the legislative power was
exercised by someone other than the legislature; and that the bill as passed
was not read three times on three separate days in each house. These
contentions were unavailing because the court adhered to what is generally
called the "enrolled bill rule." Under this rule, the bill as signed by the
presiding officers of both houses and by the governor stands unimpeachable by legislative journals or photostatic copies of the bill, it being conclusively presumed that no irregularity occurred in its enactment.
The contention that the act contained more than one subject matter
was likewise unavailing. An increase in excise taxes was the "thing chiefly
sought,"'" and the legislature could achieve this end by a single act relating
to taxes on both wine and malt beverages, notwithstanding the fact that
they had been treated separately in previous statutes. Houlihan v. Atkinson2 5 also presented, among other matters not relevant to this division,
the question of the validity of an act of the General Assembly, it being
contended that the title did not express what was contained in the body of
the act. The statute " authorized supplementing the salary of a superior
court judge in addition to the amount paid by the state under the 1945
Constitution27" and the amount paid by the county under a 1927 amendment to the State Constitution. 2' The title of the statute referred to the

increased salary as being "in addition to that now provided for by the
Constitution of the State." The contention was that the salary paid under
the 1927 amendment, referred to in the body of the act, was not referred
to in the title since that amendment was no longer a part of the State
Constitution. The Supreme Court held, however, that since the 1927
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.
206
Ga.
206
205
Ga.
GA.
Ga.

CONST. Art JII, § 1, 1 1, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-1301 (1948 Rev.).
CONST. Art III, § 7, f17, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-1907 (1948 Rev.).
CONST. Art III, § 7, 18, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-1908 (1948 Rev.).
CONsT. Art III, § 7, 15, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-1915 (1948 Rev.).
Ga. 477, 57 S.E.2d 578 (1950).
Laws 1949 Ex. Sess., p. 5.
Ga. at 486-487, 57 S.E.2d at 584.
Ga. 720, 55 S.E.2d 233 (1949).
Laws 1949, p. 406.
CONsT. Art VI, § 12, 1 1, GA. CODE ANN. § 2-4701 (1948 Rev.).
Laws, 1927, p. 111, ratified Nov. 6, 1928.
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amendment was brought forward as a part of the 1945 Constitution, both
salary provisions referred to in the body of the statute were provided for
by parts of the Constitution and the title of the act therefore expressed
the contents of the statute. In Lamon v. Yarbrough"' without prolonged
discussion the court said a mere reading of the act showed there was no
merit to the contention that the title did not express the contents of the
act.
In Smith v. Clayton3" the court followed a growing volume of precedent
in declaring ineffective a statute "' relating to jury trials in the City Court
of Floyd County, on the ground that the enrolled bill did not show compliance with the provision respecting notice of intention to apply for local
legislation.
29. 206 Ga. 50, 55 S.E.2d 551 (1949).
30. 80 Ga. App. 21, 55 S.E.2d 171 (1949).
31. Ga. Laws 1949, p. 1827.

